Concerns were expressed when a senior officer of the DTLR attended a meeting between ABP and Adsteam (the tug company on the Humber) and openly defended ABP’s position with regard to the Humber Pilot Service. (See enclosed Minutes of the meeting on 11th January 2002.)
By the very publication of this report the DTLR have demonstrated an even greater degree of collusion with ABP than most of us have previously realised.
By using only ABP’s data and information, accepting it at face value, and not checking its accuracy the DTLR are overtly assisting ABP in its efforts to maximise profits from pilotage at the expense of safety standards.
The DTLR document is seriously flawed in that it contains inaccuracies, untruths, and inappropriate assumptions based on misinformation.
Clause 9.5 demonstrates how the DTLR have accepted, without question, a crucial statement from ABP that “compliance with the code was incompatible with the arrangements under that contract” (referring to the agreement between Humber Pilots Ltd and ABP). It is imperative that the DTLR investigate which clauses or words of the agreement made it non-compliant?
Can any other CHA now de-authorise all its pilots and install a cheaper, less qualified, service whilst assuring the DTLR that “compliance with the code was incompatible with the arrangements under that contract”?
The following observations will highlight some of the inaccuracies contained in the report. Many of the statements made by the DTLR can be proved to be untrue.
The document is presently being used as a placatory reference document to fend off genuine safety concerns of the general public and members of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords?
When some of the statements are proved to be untrue the DTLR’s document should be publicly withdrawn.
Para: ii. (Page 1)
The DTLR state once more that it would “be inappropriate for them to
intervene in an industrial dispute, although they are concerned that the CHA
should continue its legal duty to support the safe navigation of vessels on the
Humber”.
The fact is that the DTLR have allowed the CHA to reduce the previously high safety standards in order that they would not have to negotiate with Humber Pilots Ltd. Vessels carrying dangerous cargoes, have been allowed to navigate the Humber without a pilot. Many vessels carrying dangerous cargo are being instructed to proceed to the anchorage without pilot; previously these vessels were subject to compulsory pilotage. (See Appendix “A”). Large vessels berthed at the Tetney Mono Mooring Buoy in the mouth of the Humber are no longer required to have a pilot on board during discharge, so less pilots required but a reduction in safety standards. One such vessel had to leave the buoy without a pilot on board because the weather precluded the pilot boarding.
PEC holders have been allowed to use ABP’s launches to board and disembark their company’s vessels at sea and “pilot” them through the Humber Estuary, in contravention of the Pilotage Act 1987. (See Appendix “B”) The last two sentences in Section 7.13 appear to condone this practice.
“Officials have maintained regular contact with the authority in order to confirm the assurances which they have given that the safe operation of the Humber ports will not be affected by the dispute”. Does this mean that the Department has regularly contacted ABP and asked them if the new service was safe? ABP would of course find it very difficult to say it was not safe. Have the DTLR done any detailed investigation into incidents such as the Captain who asked if he could proceed without his pilots as they were tired and confused, or the lost ABP pilot on his mobile phone asking ABP control for advice or the pilot who dragged a buoy and its anchor for three miles over gas pipelines without knowing he had even contacted the buoy?
Is the department aware that ABP pilots have been disembarking from vessels up to 35,000 tons five miles inside the limit of the district, previously a disciplinary offence, to facilitate being boarded early enough for their next act of pilotage?
The DTLR use the “withdrawal by the normal service provider” as an excuse for allowing the CHA to ignore the “detail (of the PMSC) applicable in normal circumstances” (para. 5 page 2).
Is this not interfering in an industrial dispute?
Section 1:5
“The kind of changes discussed in this paper were not of course envisaged when the Code was debated, but it does not preclude them, provided the implementing authority can demonstrate objectively that proper standards are being maintained”
Why have we the public been refused access to the independent risk assessment? If there were no serious reservations expressed by the risk assessor then why not publish it? The inevitable conclusion is that there is something to hide.
“The dept has had no complaints from shipping interests”. There have been numerous complaints from shipmasters but they are reluctant to put their complaints in writing. (See Appendix “C”)
Section 3:6
These figures show an average reduction in piloted ships since December 12th of 17%.
Section 3:7
Note 24 shows a limited understanding of the arrangements. Humber Pilots received an agreed percentage of the gross revenue from pilotage. Therefore if the pilots produced more revenue by working harder so both ABP’s profit and the sums paid to the pilots was higher than estimated. At the year end the percentage payable to Humber Pilots was recalculated to achieve a target of within 5% of the agreed level of earnings. This has been explained previously in detail to Andrew Burr of the DTLR.
Section 3.8
The DTLR states that “7 HPL pilots were detached from piloting work and assigned to work in the port control centre as “pilot master” - a combination of duties the main element of which was calling pilots from the turn list”. This is not true. 6 HPL pilots were detached from piloting work and worked in the control tower at Spurn Point controlling the safety of all vessels entering and leaving the Humber and ensuring that their pilots were safely boarded and landed. The task of calling the pilots from the turn list was done by the ABP staff in the Data Centre at ABP’s offices in Port House.
It also states that “For each 24 hours period, two pilots were rostered to reside at Spurn Point for rarely needed emergency duties: this tied up the equivalent of 10 pilot posts”. Again, this is not true. The two pilots were mainly used for anchoring vessels that were not immediately proceeding inwards to a berth. They were also on hand for emergencies, such as ships dragging anchor or road traffic problems delaying normal boarding pilots. On occasions when the jetty at Spurn was closed due to bad weather the Base Pilots joined the turn list (an extra four men on the list) but pilots now were allocated from the turn list to anchor vessels as above so it depended how many vessels required anchoring whether this was a benefit to the turn list or not. To state that the Base Work needlessly tied up 10 pilot posts is uninformed and misleading. The only guaranteed benefit would be to not cater for emergencies, and also allow tankers to come into the anchorages without pilot, but this would mean an obvious reduction in safety.
The year on the swings was a benefit awarded to retiring pilots who had completed 25 years service and was reduced by time spent off sick during the last two years of service. This was an internal arrangement and required the rest of the pilots to work unpaid overtime to provide this benefit for their older colleagues. ABP’s offer of 110 posts effectively removed this benefit for the future, a further reduction in terms and conditions over and above the salary reduction and increase in time on duty.
HPL Committee, previously reduced to 5 pilots, was increased to 7 pilots when the committee workload increased due to a somewhat
confrontational stance adopted by ABP during the mid 1990’s. The
unsubstantiated claims that two of these committee members did less than 100 acts do not mention a time period or whether pilot master duties were taken into account. However their time off the turn list was offset by their colleagues working harder and had no effect on HPL supplying a pilot on demand to every vessel as per the Contract.
So, to recap section 3.8:
6 pilots in the control tower would be no longer required and vessels transiting the Estuary would be overseen by non-pilots.
Previously all tankers were compulsorily piloted into the inner anchorages. Do these vessels still need a pilot to anchor? If so, then there are no less pilots required.
Some pilots (6 mentioned in the document) were on non-active service, but the removal of this benefit in the future represented a further reduction in terms and conditions.
The Committee would no longer be required under ABP’s new in house service but the turn list willingly worked harder to enable a reduced piloting role for these men. Therefore there should be no reduction in numbers due to not having a Committee.
So it is clear that the only legitimate reduction in numbers would be attained by removing the pilotage experience in the control tower (which may be seen as a reduction in safety standards) and by not piloting vessels, including tankers, into the anchorages. If ABP were allowed to reduce standards in this way then there would be a case for reducing the “proper number of pilots” (see section 3.7) by approximately 12 men, leaving us with 142 pilots required, 32 more than the 110 intended maximum. The DTLR and ABP use the “proper number” of pilots when comparing the remunerative aspects of their offer and it is important to compare like with like.
Section 3:9
The Contract allowed Humber Pilots 134 days clear of duty. In 1991 the Humber Pilots voted to change their working cycle from 14 days on/6 days off to 13 on/7 off and this change was sanctioned by ABP. It must be made clear that this did not reduce the number of acts per pilot but was a wish of the pilots to work harder during the time on duty to achieve more days clear of duty. The rostered pilots were on duty 24 hours per day. The DTLR state that the new turn list will be 13 days on and 5 off. Can we ask the DTLR what time these men are removed from the turn list at the end of their rostered duty period and is it possible that they may be allocated a job on that day before going off duty?
Section 3:10
“Pilots will not be expected to do on average more than one act per working day”. The figures demonstrate that this is not the case. The figures guarantee that on average the new men will do more than one act per day. The normal allowance for 4% sickness increases the acts per pilot to over 246 per annum. Any ongoing training would, of course, either increase the days on duty or the number of acts per day whilst on the turn list.
HPL’s rules had no effect on the predictability of allocation of pilots as all the necessary information was on the “voicemail service”.
“The authority could not regulate this” (the turn list).
The authority did indeed regulate the turn list in complete contradiction to the DTLR’s statement, in fact one pilot was disciplined and fined by ABP for leaving the turn list for Pilot Master training at the behest of the Committee.
Section 3:12
Naturally HPL objected to having to spend more days on duty in order that they could cope with 110 pilots doing the work of 142 pilots (see our response to Section 3.8).
The last sentence is of course not relevant as the total number of days clear is well short of the national average.
Section 3.13
The DTLR do not consider that an excessive number of days on duty might lead to fatigue. Would they consider that 66 men on duty for 365 days is OK?
Section 3.14
Maintaining numbers on the turn list is not the only consideration. See above.
Section 3.15
Footnote 30 on page 9 accepts without question the doubtful
claim that less than 600 hours were spent on the bridge of a ship in a year
(this information has been previously admitted by ABP to be inaccurate), and
assumes another 4 hours per act from being called to returning home. The DTLR
do not say how they have arrived at this assumption, but they have not
consulted Humber Pilots. When was the “act of pilotage presented as part of
a working day of 8-10 hours”?
Do the 600 hours include time piloting in a dock?
Actual data kept by Humber Pilots shows that this figure is not accurate, (a fact previously admitted by ABP), and should be much higher. Even then, no acknowledgement has been made for the legitimate need to credit standby time in a port that is not exclusively tidal or where it is not feasible to work shifts.
Section 3.16
Back to back jobs, organised by the control centre, do not guarantee equality of work and eventually cause disquiet.
Procedures were in place previously, which ensured that pilots would not accept a job unless they were sufficiently rested.
Section 3.17
In 1988 the three specialised services within the Humber Estuary, Humber Goole and Trent, amalgamated at the insistence of ABP and in return for piloting the small ships the whole 48 miles instead of changing pilots at Hull (reducing the number of pilots required by approximately 50), all pilots received a first class wage. At the same time the Competent Harbour Authority became a profit-motivated company. By dismissing 136 Humber Pilots and recruiting permanent, lesser qualified, lower class pilots for these small ships, ABP is able to increase its annual profit from pilotage on the Humber by an estimated £3 million. The DTLR states, “There is not a single right answer”. Surely, this is the wrong answer.
Section 3.19
The raising of the limits of third class enables the numbers of third class pilots, and therefore profits, to be to be increased even further.
Section 3.21
Over the period in question (12 Dec 2002 to early April) “the new VLS pilots (working in pairs) have already done over 100 ships each”. Assuming 7 pairs = 14 pilots and assuming the period equates to 110 days there must have been at least 6 of these ships every day, or about 180 per month. Can we see the evidence for this?
Section 3.22
“The authority rightly believes the benefits justify this complication”.
These benefits being increased profits for the authority, and the DTLR says they are right?
Section 3.23
ABP’s reorganisation of the class system was simply to create more profit. The reasons for ABP’s actions (increased profit) must surely be within the scope of this DTLR “Note”.
Section 4.2
Could the DTLR tell us which districts do not require a Foreign Going Master’s Certificate?
Section 4.6
HPL have not been consulted at any time.
Former apprentices had, as part of their seagoing qualifications, a five year apprenticeship on the pilot cutters. No mariners with equivalent qualifications were excluded.
Section 4.7
Statutory authorities cannot make objective assessments when also a profit-driven company.
Section 4.8
A “Master’s Ticket” means an unlimited Foreign Going Master’s Certificate. Despite Mr Burr of the DTLR being asked to confirm that ABP’s new recruits “master’s tickets” are indeed unlimited Foreign Going Master’s Tickets, he has refused to answer. See 4.10. (See also correspondence between HPL and Mr Burr: Appendix “D”)
There were no substantial waiting lists for jobs, of persons who fitted the normal age limit, so the limit was temporarily waived.
Section 4.9
Note the requirements for a third class pilot. No Deck Officer Certificate of Competency required, but must be willing to progress the largest vessels entering the estuary.
Section 4.10
Do 88% of ABP’s new pilots have an unlimited Masters Ticket, as do Humber Pilot members? (See correspondence; Appendix “D”.)
Who assessed the exemption certificate holders as already having adequate knowledge?
Section 4.13
“The harbour Authority changed the recruitment criteria… because they could not afford to exclude sectors of the recruitment pool when a large number of new pilots were needed at the same time”.
“so long as steps were taken to ensure that the assessment for authorisation was at least as rigorous as before, the change has not lowered the standard of Humber Pilots”
The CHA recruited
candidates who had previously been turned down as unsuitable, and also rung
several who turned down the offer of a job over the phone.
At the time of writing this response they have still not recruited sufficient pilots to offer pilotage on demand.
Section 4.17
Humber Pilots cannot retire at 57 without loss of benefits. Pensions are abated at a rate of over 5% p.a. for every year under 58 at retirement.
Section 5.1
How long had the ABP pilot on the “Stena Gothica” been authorised?
Section 5.3
The industrial action by Humber Pilots Ltd should not have affected ABP’s training plans, in fact it probably was beneficial because ABP’s pilots would be willing to train new recruits.
Section 5.4
If there were no serious reservations expressed by the risk assessor then why not publish it? The inevitable conclusion is that there is something to hide.
Section 5.5
“New recruits were generally more experienced mariners” Have the DTLR studied the experience of previous Humber Pilots or is this assumption based simply on the age of the new recruits (some in their 60’s)?
Sections 5.6 and 5.7
Can we see the risk assessment?
Section 5.8
We understand that one newly authorised pilot had been trained for all of two days.
Section 5.10
“..to charter four coasters(1000 to 5000 dwt) to use as
training vessels”
The 4 coasters used by ABP for training had deadweight tonnages of 670, 726, 1006, and 1021. So a more accurate statement would be “670 to 1021 dwt”. Why did the DTLR use these figures regarding the size of these coasters? Who gave them the figures? Why did they not check them in Lloyds Register of Shipping? Have they checked any information given to them by ABP?
Section 5.12
Simulator training does not replace proper training by experienced pilots. It is a training aid and should only be regarded as such. It is only of any use when explained by an experienced pilot. The Harbour Master Humber had never been senior pilot on any VLS inward to the jetties at Immingham.
Section 5.14
It was of course possible to adhere to the IMO recommendation 485. All ABP had to do was to meet with Humber Pilots Ltd and attempt to resolve the differences; although this would not have satisfied their increased profit aspirations.
Section 5.15
Were the DTLR aware of the harbour master’s lack of VLS experience when they wrote this document? Which members of the training team had experience at Grimsby, Hull, Humber Sea Terminal, New Holland, and River Trent?
Section 5.22
“This issue has now been addressed” (the issue of new pilots receiving training with tugs). Has the DTLR been re-assured by ABP, or have they actually observed and listened to the new pilots operating with tugs and satisfied themselves that the new pilots are now competent at handling tugs?
Section 5.24
If local pilotage experience is not indispensable in pilotage for mariners otherwise experienced in the command and handling of ships, why have pilots at all?
Section 5.25
Again, why not publish the risk assessment?
Section 6.2
The Humber incident log (Appendix “E”) refutes all parts of this section. As far as we know the training coasters did not often do repeated berthings, but swung off the berth and proceeded outwards. But if they did, why is it that ABP pilots freely admitted that they had never been to certain berths before etc (see Humber Incident Log)?
Section 7.6
Humber Pilots gave notice of withdrawal of labour on 4th December 2001 although it appears that ABP did not have any intention of attempting to resolve the dispute with the Humber Pilots. The DTLR assume rather a lot when stating what Humber Pilots were considering at this time.
Section 7.8
Can we see the MCA’s assessor’s report?
Section 7.9
Newly authorised pilots trained the new recruits. Can this be true?
Section 7.12
Almost without exception the arrangement, in the event of a pilot not being available immediately, requiring the vessel to wait was respected. Does this mean that on at least one occasion it was not?
Section 7.13
This Section explains how ABP have disregarded the Pilotage Act allowing blatant PEC abuse, which has also been sanctioned by the DTLR.
Section 8.6
Why did all pilots sign the new disciplinary procedures? These new procedures were brought in at the insistence of the pilots. The disclaimer on the incident form is normal practice and Humber Pilots submitted a report for every incident, as required by the authority. We note that this requirement has been relaxed somewhat. Humber Pilots have only complained about the misuse and manipulation of the disciplinary procedure by the Harbour Master who frequently was untruthful during the hearings.
Section 8.7
We had no grievance or complaints procedure. Why did not the authority insist on a grievance procedure in line with the PMSC. “The harbour authority believes it is in a better position to obtain reports from employed pilots…” Can the DTLR explain why the procedure for reporting incidents is simpler if one is employed?
Section 8.9
The data from ABP on incident reports should be published in detail. ABP are providing data to prove that their new service is relatively safe. No member of Humber Pilots Ltd will object to personal data being provided in detail. This information is crucial to the arguments about safety. When the difference in claimed incidents is so great (ABP say 400 incidents per year in its press release and Humber Pilots claim less than 170 incidents during 2001) ABP have a duty to prove that the information is correct.
Section 8.10
The safety of the Humber is of great concern to the general public, although we realise it is in ABP’s interests to avoid bad publicity.
Section 8.11
The DTLR have not consulted with HPL as to the accuracy or completeness of our log of incidents.
Section 8.12
With regard to at least one incident on the Humber since 27th January 2002, MAIB have consulted with senior pilot members of Humber Pilots Ltd.
Again ABP’s press release states that there were 400 incidents per year “when pilots were provided under a contract with HPL”. We must sight the data to confirm that these incidents include only ships piloted by members of Humber Pilots Ltd because, conveniently, the wording is changed in 8.16 and the figures show “the new pilotage service’s record”.
We do not understand the DTLR’s comment that “It is incomplete for incidents in enclosed docks which are strictly outside the act of pilotage”. Humber Pilots provided a service to and from the berth, including the pilotage inside enclosed docks.
Sections 8.15 and 8.16
Data needs to be confirmed as relating to ships piloted by Humber Pilots.
Section 8.18
Even with the assistance of ABP, the Dept has not been able to identify 400 incidents for the most recent years. Does this mean that ABP’s press release was not factually correct or not verifiable? The weather after the 12th December 2001 was particularly benign, the best for many years for the time of year, however, on at least one occasion, the pilot service was suspended in fog for the first time ever.
Section 8.21
This illustrates precisely what Humber Pilots have been saying. ABP investigated more incidents previously than they now do. It is up to ABP which incidents they investigate and report to MCA. This may indicate a dereliction of statutory duty by ABP.
Section 8.22
1. Who reportedly corroborated the pilot’s account of the incident? The procedures for making tugs fast earlier were already in place. Will MAIB be producing a report?
2. What was the appropriate action taken against the pilot in charge of the training coaster?
3. We understand that the pilot on the “Stena Gothica” had been authorised for only three weeks.
Section 8.23
This is incorrect. The procedures in force before the new pilot service meant that the pilots for both vessels would have had at least three years experience as a pilot.
Section 8.25
These figures show an increase of 32% in collisions with structures, but the DTLR states “the record does not show any increase in the rate of incidents in this category”…??????
Section 8.26
Which is the one incident? The “Rolf Buck” in collision with the “Celtic Forrester”, or the “Arold” in collision with the “Anjola”, or the “City of Rome” in collision with the “Maya”, or the ……..
Section 8.27
Has there been an investigation by the DTLR into the significant increase in these incidents? Has a cause been identified? Insufficient training and experience perhaps? The piloted vessel (that was taking avoiding action and put the tug in jeopardy) should have never been in that position in the first place.
Section 8.28
A floating mark that has been nearly missed????
Section 8.32
The overall record for groundings since Dec 12th does not compare well with the record of Humber Pilots during 2001.
Section 8.35
ABP’s Dock Masters report reduced damage to dock structures. Could we see these reports? Humber Pilots have received reports, as early as 4th January 2002 that damage done by ABP pilots in Goole is not to be charged. We have also been informed that Dock Masters in Immingham have been instructed by ABP not to log all damage.
Section 8.37
“The rate of incidents is broadly unaffected by the transition to the new service, although it has risen in some categories – for partly unexplained reasons”. Please allow us to explain the reasons!
Section 9.2
The risk “assessment has been completed” but why are we not allowed to see it? Why won’t ABP publish their document? Have they got something to hide?
Section 9.3
No pilotage body was consulted on the risk assessment. One would think that if the PMSC requires a Risk Assessment to be carried out, then by implication the Assessment should be published.
Section 9.4
The considered strategic plan involved increasing profits from pilotage by £3million. The giving of notice on the commercial contract by HPL was accepted by both parties as an attempt to build a better relationship, based on mutual respect and trust. The subsequent non-negotiable offer of employment by ABP was derisory and also strategic. A survey indicates that Humber Pilots already had the worst terms and conditions of comparable districts, so the non-negotiable offer made by ABP which reduced these terms and conditions by up to 45% (or in the case of 26 of the members, 100%) was deliberately pitched to be unacceptable to a professional body of men.
Section 9.5
Humber Pilots also asked for EMPLOYMENT under the same terms and conditions as ABP’s employed pilots in Southampton but were turned down by ABP. DID THE DEPARTMENT THINK THAT “COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE CONTRACT BETWEEN HPL AND ABP” OR DID THEY ACCEPT, WITHOUT QUESTION, THIS CRUCIAL STATEMENT FROM ABP?
Section 9.7
The risk assessment has not been published. How can this document use it as a reference so many times? No mention has been made of the trainees who left ABP complaining that the training was “inadequate”, a “joke” and “unprofessional”. No mention of the trainee who gave notice after being asked to start work as a first class pilot after only three weeks training. The reduction in pilot complement has not been substantiated in this document (see our response to section 3.8 and press cutting from Yorkshire Post, January 2002).
Section 9.8
The Code was used by ABP as the reason for not continuing with the Contract with HPL. See our response to section 9.5.
Section 9.9
So even if the CHA did not comply with the PMSC the Department has no power to instruct them or intervene in any way?
Section 10.7
It IS clear to most people that an independent body responsible for pilotage would remove the profit motivated aspect from pilotage. The implication of the lowering of safety standards in the name of profit is not recognised by the DTLR and they fail to address any valid concerns with the production of this document.
Section 10.8
The interests of safety will not be served by allowing a CHA to put profits above safety standards. The department seem to forget that ABP stand to make an extra £3million pounds profit per annum from their new pilotage regime. The raising of the third class limit to allow less qualified personnel to pilot these larger vessels reduces the wage bill and increases ABP’s profits. (In the name of safety?)
“The evidence in this note has shown that the authority has exercised its powers competently..” The evidence in this note has been shown to be seriously flawed, full of inaccuracies and untruths, supplied, we assume, by ABP, and accepted without question by the DTLR. Will the DTLR be prepared to withdraw this document and investigate the facts fully? Does parliament now believe that the Secretary of State should have the power to override a CHA’s powers if it was found to be exercising its powers more in the name of profit than the safety of the environment?
Section 10.9
What was wrong with the Contract with HPL? Why did it prevent ABP from protecting itself?
Section 10.10
Humber Pilots Ltd gave notice on the contract with ABP so that the relationship with ABP could be improved. Although the DTLR are well aware of this fact, they do not acknowledge it anywhere in this document. Why did ABP feel it appropriate to recruit a whole new pilot service rather than discuss the problems identified in the contract?
Section 10.11
ABP have never had procedures for resolving disputes with HPL. ABP had the final word. HPL could either agree with ABP or determine the contract.
Section 10.12
The lower the number of pilots, the greater the profit for the CHA. The lower the qualifications required, the harder the pilot will work for lower wages, enabling the CHA to increase profit.
The authority decides which numbers of each class are appropriate.
Section 10.13
Is the DTLR empowered to query the CHA’s decision with regard to pilot numbers? Bearing in mind our response to section 3.8, will the DTLR review this section of the document?
The fact that this document has been produced by the DTLR using information supplied by ABP, without input from any professional organisation or independent body, begs the question; why?
By producing this document, and accepting ABP’s statistics and information at face value, the DTLR are overtly assisting ABP in their endeavour to maximise profits from pilotage by removing the experienced well qualified workforce of Humber Pilots Ltd and installing a lesser qualified and cheaper substitute. This is surely not an acceptable role for a government department.
The DTLR readily admit (Section 3.7) that the reduction of pilot numbers in ABP’s non-negotiable offer to Humber Pilots was one of the main points of disagreement between the parties. So let us compare ABP’s offer with the previous terms and conditions of the Humber Pilots.
Days on duty. Salary x No. Salary x No. Salary x No. Salary x No.
Offer 234 £50K x 12 £45K x 30 £40K x 15 £35K x 53
Previous 211 £58K* x 136**
* All pilots would achieve 1st Class status within four years.
** The proper number of pilots according to the Contract was 154. ABP were in charge of recruitment and authorisation and paid HPL the agreed level (£45K +) for 154 pilots.
Employees Pension Contributions of up to 7% are included in the salary.
This means that by accepting the offer the potential losses in salary were as follows; (not allowing for Private Medical Insurance).
12 pilots lose up to 20%.
30 pilots lose up to 28%.
15 pilots lose up to 36%.
53 pilots lose up to 44%.
26 pilots lose 100%.
These losses, when considered alongside the increased workload and time on duty (apart from the 26 with no job at all!), amounted to a cynical offer that the authority knew could not be accepted by a professional service who were aware that even their previous terms and conditions did not compare favourably with any similar district in the UK.
Can the DTLR explain how ABP’s new service, the least qualified, the lowest paid, the hardest working in terms of time on duty and the least experienced of all comparable districts, has improved safety and benefited the environment and river users.
ABP’s new service should benefit ABP to the tune of an extra £3million per annum.
Are the DTLR aware of this?
Many of the statements made in this document can be proved to be incorrect.
The DTLR have allowed ABP to completely ignore some sections of the PMSC whilst declaring its Contract with Humber Pilots Ltd incompatible with the Code.
ABP’s unilateral interpretation of the Code is similar to their treatment of the Contract with Humber Pilots Ltd and illustrates why the dispute arose on the Humber.
1. In paragraph 3.8 of the document, the DTLR assert that 7 pilots were detached from piloting work for Pilot Master duties. The actual number detached was 6 for that role. Can you explain why you quote 7?
2. We are aware that many tankers carrying dangerous cargo, (previously all tankers were subject to compulsory pilotage) are now being instructed to anchor themselves without pilot. Does the DTLR regard this as a reasonable strategy to reduce the number of pilots required and so increase profits for the CHA or is it a reduction in safety standards?
3. In Section 3.11 the DTLR state that the authority could not regulate the turn list. Are the DTLR aware that at least one Humber Pilot has been disciplined and fined by ABP for leaving the turn list for training at the behest of HPL Committee but without the Harbour Master’s express permission, demonstrating beyond doubt that ABP did indeed regulate the turn list.
4. In section 3.15 the DTLR have made assumptions on the time spent to complete an act of pilotage. Did they consult with Humber Pilots Ltd or is the information supplied solely by ABP?
5. In section 3.21 the DTLR state that “the new VLS pilots (working in pairs) have already done over 100 ships each”. Assuming 7 pairs = 14 pilots and assuming the period equates to 110 days, there must have been at least 6 of these ships every day. This would be double the previous average. Can the DTLR confirm both the source of information and its validity?
6. On the 2nd April 2002 a large RO-RO ferry, the “Stena Gothica”, collided with a jetty at Immingham. Previously the pilot for this size of vessel would have been authorised for at least three years. Could you tell the House on what date the pilot was authorised by ABP?
7. The new ABP pilots are now training for the whole district because the division of the harbour into pilotage areas was impractical for the allocation of pilots and equality of work. Can the DTLR explain now what the benefits of the new pilotage service are, apart from the estimated extra profit of £3million for ABP?
8. In maritime circles, a Master’s Ticket is accepted as an Unlimited Foreign Going Master’s Ticket. Can the DTLR confirm, as stated in Section 4.10 of the document, that at least 88% of ABP’s new pilots have an Unlimited Foreign Going Master’s Certificate?
9. In Section 5.10 of the document the DTLR state that the training coasters were “between 1000 and 5000 deadweight tonnage”. The actual deadweight tonnages were 670, 726, 1006, and 1021. Why did the DTLR quote “between 1000 and 5000 dwt”? These measurements are readily available in “Lloyds Register of Shipping”. Have the DTLR checked any of the information supplied by ABP?
10. Having seen the amount of concern over the new ABP pilotage regime, why have the DTLR not published the risk assessment which is referred to so many times in their document?
11. Given the DTLR’s averred objectivity in the dispute between HPL and ABP why did a senior representative attend a meeting between ABP and the Humber tug company (Adsteam) and openly support ABP and its policies? (Minutes of the meeting are available)
12. In Section 8.25 the figures show an increase of 32% in collisions with structures. How can the DTLR state “the record does not show any increase in the rate of incidents in this category”?
13. In Section 9.5 of the document, the DTLR accept that “the previous arrangements with Humber Pilots Ltd made compliance with the Port Marine Safety Code incompatible”. Which clauses of the previous contract made the arrangements incompatible? Has anybody from the department asked them?
14. The Port Marine Safety Code includes risk assessment. Does it not follow that if these assessments are not published by the CHA, then the CHA, a profit motivated company, cannot be observed to be objective in the interpretation of these reports?
15. In Section 5.5 of the document the DTLR states that “new recruits were generally more experienced mariners” (than Humber Pilots). Have the DTLR studied the relative experience of the old Humber Pilots and the present new service to verify this sweeping statement? If not, on what was the assumption based?
16. Have ABP paid for any repairs to any damage caused by (or to) any piloted vessel since 12th December 2002.
17. Are any of the new ABP pilots on the Humber non-EU nationals?
18. Can you tell the House the profit made from pilotage on the Humber last year, and total profit since 1st October 1988?
19. Could you produce details and evidence of the incidents involving the former Humber Pilots to back up the DTLR’s statements in Section 8 of the document?
19. Has ABP on the Humber, since 12th December 2002, offered a PEC to a Master/Mate without them taking the normal examination?
20. Why, on the Humber, has the DTLR allowed the practice of boarding PEC holders on their company’s vessels to pilot the vessel whilst not a boa fide Master or Mate of the vessel in direct contravention of the Pilotage Act?
21. Has the Government any financial interest in ABP?
22. In Section 4.13 of the document, the DTLR states that a CHA may change the recruitment criteria “so long as steps were taken to ensure that the assessment for authorisation was at least as rigorous as before”. Is the DTLR seriously saying that a CHA can take on recruits with no previous maritime experience from any background so long as the assessment for authorisation is at least as rigorous as before?
23. If the information supplied to the DTLR, forming the basis of the document “The New Humber Pilot Service” is found to be misleading and in any way untrue, what will the DTLR do with the document?