HUMBER PILOTS’ DISPUTE

HISTORY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE CURRENT POSITION

1 1 The provenance of the pilot service on the River Humber can be traced back to the sixteenth century; on the River Ouse to the nineteenth century; and on the River Trent to the early twentieth century. As trade developed in these areas, so the demand for pilotage services evolved and there were established three distinct services, serving these three rivers.

2 2 At least as far back as 1973 and probably before that, there was occasional casual expression of ideas about integrating these services, but nothing positive was done until 1986.

3 3 Around 1984/85, serious consideration had to be given to the matter when it became obvious that radical legislation was inevitable, so necessitating consideration of a plan that would protect our long-term interest. Not all pilots were convinced that the way forward was to amalgamate the three services, probably because of a deep-seated fear of change.

4 4 At about this time a national agreement, relating pilots’ earnings to those of Merchant Navy officers, had collapsed and pay negotiations then had to be settled locally with the pilotage authority. Even before 1988 the pilotage authority for the Humber area was ABP (the privatised successor to the nationalised ports operator the British Transport Docks Board).

5 5 There was an outstanding disagreement with ABP about compensating the pilots for the extra work they had had to carry out during the miners’ strike of 1984/85. A compromise was agreed whereby the revenue shortfall due to us would be phased back in, provided we agreed in principle to the concept of amalgamation of the three services.

6 6 We did obtain that understanding between the pilots and the representatives of the services signed a tri-partite agreement on 13 January 1986, to take forward the idea by setting up a working party with ABP, with a view to having an amalgamated service by the time the new legislation was in force.

7 7 There were many meetings of that working group and seven drafts of the contract, before an agreement was signed between Spurn Pilots Limited, (SPL), the new name of the amalgamated service, and ABP. The contract would come into force coincident with the commencement date of the Pilotage Act 1987, ie 1 October 1988.

8 8 Under the old system (pre 1988), whereby the pilots’ activities were governed by the Humber district byelaws, the pilots’ manager was an official of the pilotage authority originally known as the Commodore of Pilots but subsequently re-styled the Pilotage Operations Manager in the mid 1970s. A former pilot was customarily appointed to this post. When the incumbent changed in 1974, the new officer agreed to take over only if he could retain his pilot’s licence. This was because he had witnessed the shabby treatment meted out to his predecessors by the British Transport Docks Board and he wished to preserve an option to return to piloting ships if the relationship broke down.

9 9 That officer retired in September 1988, a month before the Pilotage Act 1987 came into force and introduced the new order. His successor, Mr Clive Wilkin, took office under the same fundamental condition, that is, retention of his licence. On 1 October 1988 ABP became the competent harbour authority and, as an authorised pilot, Mr Wilkin became a member of the pilots’ co-operative, SPL, as well as being the pilotage operations manager of ABP.

10 10 In 1990 the local Inspector of Taxes instituted an inquiry into the employment status of the members of SPL. He reasoned, inter alia, that that they were employees of SPL because the operations manager was a member of SPL and they were under his supervision to the degree that he could “govern, control and direct” their duty.

11 With assistance from solicitors the contract was amended in 1991 to a sufficient degree to mollify the Inspector. In light of what had happened, the pilots subsequently decided that future appointees to the post of Pilotage Operations Manager should no longer simultaneously be members of SPL.

12 Apart from inconsequential differences, the relationship with ABP had been generally harmonious between 1988 and 1994. In November 1994 Mr Hames was appointed to succeed Mr Wilkin on his retirement. Following the previous decision of the pilots, Hames became an employee of ABP. Despite his previous service of seventeen years as a pilot and having served as a national pilots’ representative on the committee of the United Kingdom Pilots’ Association, being its chairman for two years, he effectively severed, at a stroke, any emotional connection with his former colleagues and set about confronting them.

13 Hames is by nature, aggressive, easily angered, abusive, not amenable to compromise; someone with a need to wield power and to dominate.

14 The secondary rules of HPL provide a reward for long service in the form of a year’s “gardening leave” prior to formal retirement from service. The benefit is specifically denied to anyone taking a salaried position with ABP. Notwithstanding the fact that he had played a prominent part in drafting this rule, he claimed that he should enjoy this reward, or at least a proportion of it. To ensure that we were on firm ground in denying it to him, we took legal advice that confirmed our understanding that he was not so entitled. He responded with a strongly worded, threatening letter in which he stated: “I hope that you would not wish that I will be the only pilot who has retired...who has been denied this benefit; after all I have many years yet in my new post.” The relationship with this manager has been strained from the outset.

15 In April 1995 two pilots, Messrs Tindale and Raywood were assigned to a large tanker, Evita, to conduct her from sea to a discharging berth known as the Tetney Monobuoy, situated at the mouth of the Humber. During the berthing operation there was a collision between the ship and the buoy, resulting in damage to the buoy and an oil pipeline. Hames acted under the disciplinary procedure then in force and attached to the authorisation. That procedure was, to say the least, rudimentary and gave to the pilotage operations manager the power of inquisitor, prosecutor, judge and executioner. The internal proceedings that were actually undertaken to inquire into and settle this matter of professional shortcoming on the part of the pilots effectively subjected them to the detriment of double jeopardy and we applied for a judicial review of the harbour authority’s actions.

16 The matter was compromised literally minutes before the hearing, when final amendments were made to a new, agreed disciplinary procedure that attempted to relegate Hames to a function of prosecutor in future cases. That procedure is now appended to the authorisation and accounts for the amendments made in 1998.

17 In 1997 Hames was appointed to the post of Harbour Master Humber; the post of pilotage operations manager was subsumed under this position.

18 In 1999 Spurn Pilots Limited changed its name to Humber Pilots Limited.

19 There was a continuing deterioration in relations with Hames. He appears to take delight in humiliating and bullying. For example, negotiations on pay that were usually settled in six to eight weeks, were now taking six to eight months; the introduction of a new design of fast pilotage craft was undertaken with no consultation with the pilots; our claims for financial recompense for mistakes by the ABP pilotage clerical staff that resulted in pilots wasting their time travelling to non-existent ships, were dismissed as acceptable errors.

20 Although not directly affecting us, his relationship with the other floating plant employees was equally disquieting; the superintendent engineer felt obliged to resign after 25 years’ service and take up employment with another harbour authority in the south of England.

21 Negotiations on pay for 2001 and the provision of a safety garment of the appropriate quality, were heading in the direction of protracted, sterile meetings. [ NB: Reference to “rates” in the contract is a reference to our rates of pay, not rates that are levied on ships for pilotage services. They are for ABP alone to decide] This was probably the straw that broke the camel’s back and, after seven years, the pilots concluded that the agreement between ABP and HPL was no longer working in the interest of either party. Hames was manipulating the agreement to the extent that he would not make a final decision on their offer for 2001. We sent a letter to ABP on 19 February 2001 setting out our conditions for agreeing the negotiations for 2001 and giving an ultimatum that, unless we received confirmation of their acceptance by 28 February we would consider that they had made their final decision.

22 A satisfactory reply was not received from ABP and we gave them two months’ notice under clause 4(f) to terminate the agreement on 7 March 2001.

23 A reply was received from ABP London on 23 March in which they expressed the view that it was for ABP alone to state when they had made their final offer and not for us to infer it in the manner that we had proposed. Consequently they claimed that the two months’ notice was invalid.

24 We took further legal advice and it was suggested to us that it might be viewed as a conciliatory gesture if we withdrew our notice of two months and substituted it with the alternative period of nine months. We gave that notice on 26 April 2001.

25 We made plain to ABP that we had given notice under the agreement between ABP and HPL and we never gave them cause to believe that we wished to surrender our authorisations. In fact we requested a meeting with the directors in London with a view to setting out our hopes for the future.

26 A meeting took place on 17 May 2001 at ABP’s head office. We explained our wish to negotiate a completely fresh start whether that be under a contract of employment or a new contract for services. The members of the board who were present said they would take time to consider their intentions.

27 On 11 June 2001 each pilot received a hand-delivered letter informing him that ABP would in future employ pilots directly and had no alternative but to revoke his authorisation at 2359 on 26 January 2002.

28 On 22 June 2001 an initial letter from ABP confirmed their intention to employ pilots on defined levels of salary according to class status within their new service. There would be only 110 appointments made rather than 136, the latter being the strength of the service at the time.

29 5 July 2001 ABP offered a private interview with any pilot who wished to learn of precise terms and conditions of new employment. The offer was non-negotiable.

30 25 July 2001 at a meeting with local directors in Grimsby, we rejected the offer and suggested a way forward by negotiation.

31 27 July 2001 ABP London wrote to confirm that they would not meet the TGWU; they would not consider any alternative to employment of pilots; and that they were setting up a training scheme for new applicants who wished to train for this service.

32 1 August 2001 the first advertisement for new applicants appeared in the press.

33 2 August 2001 HPL wrote to ABP stating that we had a trade dispute with them and requesting a meeting with the Chief Executive.

34 10 August 2001 ABP wrote to each pilot making a second “final” offer of employment under the new order. Still non-negotiable.

35 11 August 2001 HPL wrote to ABP asking for a collective agreement, noting that Hames had told the Committee that he did not care whether members of HPL applied for vacancies or not.

36 14 August 2001 the Chief Executive replied that he considered a meeting unnecessary.

37 14 August 2001 the TGWU suggested that we should consider a ballot for strike action.

38 2 October 2001 a letter was sent to the board of ABP by all pilots, pointing out that we could not afford the pay cut proposed by ABP and that they were embarking on a high-risk strategy in proposing to put on the river inadequately trained people. In the meantime a HPL had initiated a ballot for strike action

39 4 October 2001 ABP advisd they were applying to the Court for an injunction to prevent the ballot being conducted. Court permitted the ballot to proceed.

40 Ballot resulted in a unanimous vote in favour of strike action.

41 17 October 2001 Captain James Chestnutt the harbour master, Southampton and ABP’s designated person under the Port Marine Safety Code, advised on behalf of the board that he was confident about the continuing safety of pilotage services on the Humber after 26 January 2002.

42 23 October 2001 commencement of High Court hearing into application for injunction by ABP to prevent our strike. Injunction granted.

43 25 October 2001 meeting between local MPs, research assistants and three members of HPL to explain the situation and its implications. The point was emphasised that we seek negotiation, not confrontation.

44 20 November 2001 HPL submitted to ABP through the TGWU a draft proposal of simple terms and conditions: all pilots who would like a job to be accepted on terms and conditions negotiated by TGWU; otherwise adequate severance for those who wished to leave.

45 23 November 2001 meeting with Chief Executive and other directors. The main sticking point now was that 70 pilots had already been recruited by ABP. They could not be dismissed. Offer made of jobs for 50 members of HPL with a fund of “hundreds of thousands of pounds” (unspecified) for the remainder. Subsequently not accepted by the members.

46 29 November 2001 Court of Appeal started to consider our appeal to overturn the injunction granted in the High Court.

47 2 December 2001 we won our point and gave notice of strike action to ABP.

48 12 December 2001 strike began. ABP put inadequately trained personnel on the river as authorised pilots.

49 4 January 2002 Chief Executive declined an offer to convene a working group to discuss the situation.

50 7 January 2002 letter from legal adviser of UKMPA to Chief Executive saying that revocation of authorisation was unlawful.

51 21 January 2002 Employment Tribunal decided there is a case to answer in respect our employment status.

52 22 January 2002 HPL informed ABP that they will return to work on 24 January at 0900. ABP declined and offered to pay us as if we had worked on the remaining three days. We eventually accepted the money.

53 25 January 2002 letter from Mr Fell confirming that authorisations would be revoked on 26 January. A meeting in London between HPL, ABP and MPs resulted in offer of jobs for 30 and derisory compensation package for the remainder.

54 18 February 2002 ballot of pilots indicated rejection of that offer by 113 to 1.

55 The dispute continues, although there are now about 70 members engaged on short-term contracts at sea; a few have redeployed permanently as pilots in other ports; some have opted to retire; and about thirty carry on the fight ashore.

56 See Employment Tribunal Link.